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prohibited; what the law on that point now is-upon all these and sim-
ilar questions no opinion is intended to be expressed in the foregoing
discussion. If injunctions are to be used, it seems clear to the present
writer that the speedy review suggested must be provided for if we
wish to preserve, perhaps one ought to say restore, the confidence of
labor in the impartiality of our legal institutions. W. W. C.
PRIVILEGE OF A LABOR UNION TO INDUCE A BREACH OF CONTRACT
Manufacturers of felt hats are divided into "makers"-and "finishers,"
the former producing "hats in the rough" and the latter preparing
them for the consumer ready to wear. In the recent case of R. & W.
Hat Shop Inc. v. Sculley (1922, Conn.) 118 .At. 55, the plaintiff
was a hat-finishing company running a non-union shop. The plain-
tiff had ordered a number of hats in the rough of one McLachlan, a
hat "maker" running a union shop, and he had acccepted the order.
A bilateral contract was thereby made, creating in each party a right
to performance by the other with the correlative duty on each to per-
form. These "unital" rights and duties were the primary juristic
effect of the operative acts of offer and acceptance; but, as a by-product
of these operative acts, each contractor obtained innumerable (or
"multital") rights in rem against all other individuals, each of whom
bore a correlative duty not at all contractual in nature. These latter
rights are often called, and were so called by the court in the instant
case, a "property right in the contract." By virtue of the rule first
laid down in Lumley y. Gye,- the plaintiff had this "property right"
against each third person, including the defendant Sculley, that such
person should not, without just cause, induce McLachlan to break the
contract to supply the plaintiff with hats in the rough.
Observe the term "without just cause." This phrase indicates that
the plaintiff's. right against Sculley was not absolute and unlimited.
As soon as a "just cause" for Sculley's action exists, the plaintiff's
right against Sculley ceases; and of course Sculley's correlative duty
to forbear from inducing McLachlan to break his contract likewise
ceases. It is not accurate to say that the plaintiff has a right to non-
interference unless the third person has an "equal or superior right."2
So far as appears in the case, Sculley (the third person in question)
had no rights at all against McLachlan or the plaintiff and they owed
no duty whatever to Sculley. The legal issue between plaintiff and
Sculley was not between "rights," whether equal or superior to each
(1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216.
This assumes that the plaintiff and the defendant can both have "rights," exist-
ing simultaneously side by side; and so indeed they can. The jural relations
that are utterly inconsistent are right in the plaintiff to forbearance by the.
defendant and privilege in the defendant not to forbear. These latter are the
relations in issue; and they are in issue because of an actual conflict in economic
interests and desires.
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other. The issue was as follows: the plaintiff asserted that on the
facts as they existed he had a right that Sculley should not induce
McLachlan to break his contract with the plaintiff and that Sculley was
under a duty to forbear from acting as he did; the defendant asserted
that the plaintiff had no such right and that he had the legal privilege
of acting as he did (that is, had no such duty to forbear). More
briefly, the issue is right against no-right in the plaintiff; and duty
against privilege in the defendant.
Sculley's action, concerning which this issue arose, and his reasons
therefor, were as follows: In 1919, the hat business was booming.
The makers of hats in the rough were not able to fill all orders of the
hat finishers. The workmen in union hat-finishing shops were likely
to be thrown out of work unless the makers of hats in the rough, of
whom McLachlan was one, should supply union finishing shops in
preference to non-union shops. Sculley was president of local No. IO,
a union of "makers," being affiliated with the union of hat "finishers"
in a large association called "United Hatters of North America."
Acting at the instance of the national officers and solely for the purpose
of keeping the affiliated union hat-finishers in work, Sculley went to
McLachlan and made the following statement: "that in their judgment
union 'finishing' shops should be given preference over non-union
'finishing' shops in the matter of supplying 'hats in the rough,' and
that no shipments of these should be made to the latter until the needs
of the union 'finishing' shops had been satisfied." The court finds
that Sculley "knew or ought to have known," from statements made
to him by McLachlan, that the latter had a contract with the plaintiff
and that McLachlan would have to break this contract if he complied
with Sculley's suggestion. The court further says: "Sculley used
no threats to McLachlan, but he obeyed the instructions and breached
his contract with plaintiff because of his knowledge of the power of
the unions to embarrass him in the operation of his factory; and his
fear that they would do so and exact a penalty from him. McLachlan
would without these instructions have filled these orders, but he was
not sorry to have a reason for breaching his contract with plaintiff,
because he could obtain for the undelivered hats a price higher than
the contract price."
From this we may assume, as does the court, that but for Sculley's
act there would have been no breach of contract by'McLachlan with
the plaintiff. The court gave judgment for 'damages in favor of the
plaintiff (Beach J., dissenting). In order to justify this decision, it
is not sufficient to find that the defendant's act was one of the necessary
antecedent facts in the absence of which McLachlan would not have
broken his contract; the rapid rise in prices and McLachlan's own
decision were also such facts. It must also be found that the defend-
ant's act was "without just cause"-without any legally justifying
reason that nullifies plaintiff's supposed "property right" against
HeinOnline -- 32 Yale L.J. 172 1922-1923
17 2 LE J RNAL
t er. e s f llo s: t e l i tiff rted t
ts t isted e ad right t at cu ley l t induce
lan t reak is tract it t e laintiff t ll as
nder t t ar fro ti g e i ; the fe dant rted
t t the l i tiff o ch right t at ad the l i ilege
f ting i t i , ch t ar). re
ri fl , issue i right t i t i t e tiff; d t .
i st i ilege i t e t.
ll 's erning i s e d s ns
, re s ll s: , t si ess s i .
e rs ts h re t l t rs f
t i i r . i i t-finishing s re
r n rk t e s f
achlan s ld i i i i
f rence - ion s. l s r sident l . 10,
rs," i filiated t t e i n t fi ishers"
r e iation ll t th i ."
ti t e ti al l se
i t fi is ers ll t
l t e t: t ir t
i ' i re ce r i
i ' ts ,'
t t i ts t tter s
f t i ' i i i ' ."
t t ll t ts
r:t t tiff
t t l t li
it ll ' . lley
t i
is tr t it f
t i ti ;
f r t t t l lan




r t i t 's
t ' cLachlan
t l i ti . t l:I i
l i tiff ( i ti ). t
i t v
t t ~ ~
r i t t; ri i ' l}




defendant and turns it into no right, that nullifies the defendant's
duty to forbear to act and turns it into a privilege to act as he did.
The real problem before the court, therefore, was one of broad
social policy. Did Sculley, on the existing facts, have "just cause"?
Was the end to be attained so desirable that it counterbalances the
injury inflicted? Is it for the general welfare that Sculley should
have the privilege of acting as he did, or that Sculley should be forbid-
den by society and not have such privilege?
The findings of the court show that Sculley's purpose was the same
as that actuating everybody else-success and survival in the struggle
of life, in the competition for economic advantages. However, he did not
expect that the direct result of his act would be money in his own
pocket or in the pockets of the members of local No. IO, of which he
was president. The expected direct result was to be a steady job for
union hat-finishers, members of allied unions. Now it is generally
agreed that success in life, a steady job, higher wages, are laudable
objects for which to strive mightily in competition with other men.
To be a laudable object the job does not have to be a job for oneself;
it may be a job for one's son, business partner, or friend, or for some-
one closely allied in interest and social position. It is clear that Sculley
had a laudable and permissible end in view. It appears also that he
had no other 'purpose or end less laudable in character. He was not
actuated by a desire to run amuck or by hatred and ill-will toward the
plaintiff.
It needs no extended consideration to be convinced that a laudable
purpose and a permissible end do not constitute "just cause" for every
possible sort of action for attaining them. A highwayman does not
have "just cause" for robbery and murder though his motive is to
obtain food for his children. A defrauder does not have "just cause"
for his lies. The fact that it may be more profitable to break a contract
than to perform it does not constitute "just cause" for the breach.
Law and organized government are maintained for the purpose of
limiting freedom, of curtailing privileges, and of providing an orderly
system of determining where privilege ceases and duty begins. The
drawing of this line between privilege and duty is the chief function
of courts; and it is no easy task, especially in cases of first impression.
Interests and desires of classes, as well as of individuals, conflict with
each other; and the line must be drawn'by a nice balancing of interests
and a compromise of desires. The rule applied must be one so con-
sistent with general welfare and desire that it will receive the "common
consent" or will otherwise receive the support of those who have the
strength to control.
In the open competition of men for trade and business the limits of
freedom are broad and the acts that are privileged are of many sorts;
yet there are limits. Certain methods of trade and competition have
been condemned and forbidden as "unfair." The privilege as against
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a competitor to use these "unfair" methods is denied, the duty not
to use them created and enforced. It is usually lawful and privileged
to undersell a competitor even though his business is ruined; a bidder
is privileged to overbid his competitor and thus to prevent him from
acquiring the goods he desires; a laborer is privileged to offer his
services at a lower wage than that asked by others even though a com-
petitor is caused to be without work. It does not follow, however, that
these acts are privileged if their purpose and effect is to induce a breach
of contract.
The doctrine of Lumley v. Gye declaring it to be tortious to induce
a servant to break his contract with his master has been extended to
all sorts of commercial contracts.3  The rule is not so broad, however,
as to include all acts that cause a breach of contract. The motive with
which the act is done is material.
4  The majority opinion in the instant
case reviews and quotes many previous opinions, and all alike use
some limiting phrase. To procure a breach of contract, "maliciously,"
or "without just cause," or in "wanton disregard of the rights" of
the plaintiff;, is declared to be unlawful. They do indeed so define
"maliciously" as not to require the element of hatred or ill-will ;8 but
they make little effort to explain what it does require or to indicate
what constitutes "just cause." As Sir Frederick Pollock has said,
we do not need the Hotise of Lords to tell us that a "wrongful" pro-
curement of breach of contract is wrongful, or that an "unlawful"
'See (I92I) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAT, 212; COMMENTS (i92I) 30 ibid. 618.
'In Aikens v. Wisconsin (1904) 195 U. S. 194, 204, 25 Sup. Ct. 3, 5, Mr.
Justice Holmes says: "It has been considered that, prima facie the intentional
infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action which, as a matter of substan-
tive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the
defendant is to escape. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, [1892, H. L.] A. C. 25.
If this is the correct mode of approach it is obvious that justifications may vary
in extent according to the principle of policy upon which they are founded, and
that while some .... are absolute,....others may depend upon the end for which
the act is done. Moran v. Dunphy (190)" 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125. .-. . It
is no sufficient answer to this line of thought that motives are not actionable
and that the standards of the law are external. That is true in determining
what a man is bound to foresee, but not necessarily in determining the extent
to which he can justify *harm which he has foreseen. Quinn v. Leathen
[19Ol, H. L.] A. C. 495, 524." 2 Wigmore, Select Cases on the Law of Torts
(1912) 89o, says that malice as a test is "futile," but that "motive, however,
must always be one of the considerations affecting the excuse."
'Lumley v. Gye, supra note i; Angle v. C. St. P., M. & 0. Ry. (1893) 151 U. S.
I, 14 Sup. Ct. 240.
'South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co. [19o5, H. L.] A. C.
239; Walker v. Cronin (1871) lO7 Mass. 555; Berry v. Donovan (1905) 188
Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603.
'Bitterman v. L. & N. Ry. (1907) 207 U. S. 205, 223, 28 Sup. Ct. 91, 97.
SPollock, Torts (ith ed. 1920) 332; Bittermai v. L. & N. Ry., supra
note 7.
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act or an act "without lawful justification" is unlawful.9 In a few
instances, one of which is the present case, the courts have said that
economic competition is not justification.'" This comes reasonably
near to a statement that no "just cause" for inducing a breach of con-
tract can exist. Apparently no case, if we exclude strike and boycott
cases, attempts to enlighten us on what constitutes a "just cause" for
such a result.
Is assistance to be obtained from the cases involving strikes and
boycotts? Beach J., dissenting, thinks there is. He says: "The
question may be tested by inquiry whether the makers employed in his
[McLachlan's] shop had a legal right [privilege] to strike in order
to compel him to give priority in deliveries to union finishing shops."
On the other hand, Wheeler, C. J., for the court, says: "The question
of the right [privilege] of the makers in McLachlan's factory to strike
is not involved in this case; nor is the question of their right to strike
when they know that the strike will cause their employer to breach
his contracts involved." It is true that Sculley does not appear to have
been an employee of McLachlan and the court says that he "used no
threats to McLachlan." But although the privilege of the workmen
to strike is not being decided, it appears to be true that if they would
be privileged to strike for the purposes involved in the action of Sculley,
so too would their president Sculley be privileged to act for them in
carrying on such a strike, and a fortiori in requesting McLachlan to
bring about the desired end without threatening any strike at all.-'
The court is obviously loath to say that McLachlan's workmen would
not be privileged to strike for higher wages for themselves in case
they know that such a strike will make it impossible for him to perform
his existing contracts with his customers. Should they not also, in spite
of such contracts, be privileged to strike to prevent his using non-union
materials or to prevent his sending his union-made materials to non-
union shops until all union shops are supplied? judge Beach thinks that
they are so privileged: "Although they knew of the contract, they might
. "Pollock, op. cit. 330. "Epithets such as 'unlawful' prove nothing, but only
beg the question." Isaacs, K. C., arguing in the Glamorgan case, supra note 6,
at p. 243.
10 Walker v. Cronin, supra note 6. "Although he did it for the purpose of
promoting his own business." In the instant case the court says that the
defendant cannot justify his act by saying: 'We did not do it to cause you
injury or to breach your contract, but to improve our financial condition;
the breach of your contract was a mere incident to the fulfillment of our
purpose." See Angle v. Chicago etc., Ry., supra note 5; Beekinan v. Marsters
(I9o7) 195 Mass. 205, 8o N. E. 817; (921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 212.
' In South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glanorgan Coal Co., supra note 6,
the workmen represented by the defendants were not so privileged. In that
case their strike was itself a breach of contract with the plaintiff and this
breach was directly ordered by the defendants. The causal connection was
far more certainly proved and the establishment of "just cause" was far more
difficult.
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strike for any reason for which they might lawfully strike in the absence
of such a contract. Otherwise, employers of labor could extinguish
the possibility of lawful strikes by, posting notices of their outstanding
contract obligations."' 2  This looks like a strong argument, both for
justifying a strike and for justifying the defendant. If sound, it
points directly to a line of decisions to which we can go for determining
what is "just cause." 3
Judge Beach is clearly correct when he says that "the duty to refrain
from inducing one party to break his contract with the other is purely
passive." It is a duty to forbear, not a duty to act. Neither McLach-
lan's workmen nor the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to assist
McLachlan to perform his contract with the plaintiff; and the latter
surely had no right against them that they should actively assist. The
majority opinion does not assert the contrary; but it definitely holds
that the representatives of a union are under the legal duty not to make
the "statement" made to McLachlan by the defendant when they know
of his existing contracts inconsistent therewith- This is a "passive"
duty, a duty to refrain from action. Whether or not the creation of
such a duty is required by public policy and the general welfare is a
question so near the border line that honest opinion may well differ.
1 4
'Observe that this argument is applicable only in cases where the strike is
found to be the "proximate cause" of the employer's breach of contract. Is
not the employer himself the "last wrong-doer" and the responsible cause
of his own breach? The strike usually makes performance of contracts more
difficult and expensive but not impossible. The employer can usually perform
his contracts by yielding to the demands of the strikers. Conceivably,- in the
instant case, performance by McLachlan of his contract with the plaintiff was
not made totally impossible by compliance with the defendant's suggestion; but
such compliance by McLachlan made it necessary for him to see that all union
"finishing" shops were supplied with hats in the rough before performing his
contract with the plaintiff. How difficult this was may be inferred, but it was not
shown in fact.
" The instant case bears a marked analogy to cases of strikes and secondary
boycotts to prevent the use of non-union materials. The chief difference is
that in those cases the defendant may hav4e interfered only with the plaintiff's
reasonable expectation of getting business and making profit, while in the
instant case the breach of an existing contract is induced. Another difference
is that in the former, union men strike against working with non-union
materials; in the latter, the defendant was trying to prevent the working of
union-made materials by non-union men until all union men were supplied.
There is conflict as to the legal privilege of declaring secondary boycotts; a
discussion of this cannot be attemnpted here. See a series of- six comments
entitled Present Day Labor Litigation (1921) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280, 404,
5or, 618, 736; (1921) 31 ibid. 86.
14 "In the last analysis the decision in a novel situation such as that presented
in the principal case must turn upon notions of policy which the judges who are
deciding the case may entertain." Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the
Struggle for Life (1918) 27 YAiz LAW JOURNAL, 779, 80O. Writing on this and
similar problems, Pollock says: "A wide field is left open to divergent views
of economic and social policy." Pollock, op. Cit. 336.
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.strike for any reason for which they might lawfully strike in the absence
of such a contract. Otherwise, employers of labor could extinguish
the possibility of lawful strikes b~ posting notices of their outstanding
contract obligations."12 This looks like a strong argument, both for
justifying a strike and for justifying the defendant. If sound, it
points directly to a line of decisions to which we can go for determining
what is "just cause."13
Judge Beach is clearly correct when he says that "the duty to refrain
from inducing one party to break his contract with the other is purely
passive." It is a duty to forbear, not a duty to act. Neither cLach-
lan's workJ;TIen nor the defendant owed the plainti f a duty to a sist
McLachlan to perform his contract with the plainti f; and the la ter
surely had no right against them that they should actively a sist The
majority opinion does not assert the contrary; but it definitely holds
that the representatives of a union are under the legal duty not to ake
the "statement" ade to c achlan by the efendant hen they kno
of his existing contracts inconsistent there ith. his is a "passive"
duty, a duty to refrain fro action. ether or not the creation f
such a duty is required by public licy d t e eneral lfare i a
question so near t e rder li e that honest opinion ay ell differ.14
"" Observe that this argument is applicable only i cases ere t e trike i
found to be the "proximate cause" of the e ployer's reach tract. Is
not the employer himself the "last w~ong-doer" d t e s sible se
of his own breach? The strike usually akes rfor ance ntracts
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is that in the former, union en strike i st n -
materials; in the latter, the defendant as tr i t r t orki o
union-made materials by non-union e til al uni s l
There is conflict as to the legal privilege f declari seco a
discussion of this cannot be atte pted ere. S a s ri of' si co e t
entitled Present Day Labor Litigation (1921) 3 YALE JOURNA , 2 , 404,
501, 618, 736; (1921) 31 ibid. 86.
14 "In the last analysis the decision i a novel situati suc as that pres t
in the principal case must turn upon notions of policy hic the judges ho are
deciding the case may entertain." ook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the
Struggle for Life (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 7 9, 800. riti on this and
similar problems, Pollock says: "A wide field is left open to divergent vie s
of economic and social policy." Pollock, op. cit. 3 6.
COMMENTS
In arriving at a conclusion contrary to that of the majority of the court
the present writer will very likely not be followed by the majority of
lay or professional readers.
As one test of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, let us try the
shoe on the other foot. It will probably be admitted that a labor union
and its president owe no greater "duty" to the plaintiff than do other
men engaged in other lines of effort to make a living. Suppose that
X, the owner of a union hat-finishing shop, one who has been a constant
purchaser of hats in the rough from McLachlan, one who has relied
on him for a supply but who has no contract with him, should tell
McLachlan that in his opinion McLachlan should in times of shortage
supply his old customers first, and that if he does not do so he cannot
expect their continued good will and trade. If McLachlan thereupon
tells him that he has already contracted to supply the plaintiff first, must
X acquiesce and inform McLachlan that his failure to supply X will have
no evil consequences? Is not X instead privileged to leave the matter
with McLachlan for decision and does not McLachlan bear the sole legal
responsibility for his decision? Unquestionably, it is McLachlan's
legal duty to the plaintiff to supply him in accordance with his contract,
and for breach thereof the plaintiff has ample legal remedy against
McLachlan. If McLachlan, because he fears a loss of future trade with
X (trade that X is under no duty whatever to give him), chooses to
break his contract with the plaintiff, is not the choice McLachlan's alone,
and is not his act alone the proximate and the legal cause of the plaintiff's
loss? It is believed that the court should hold in the affirmative, 5 .and that
the decision should be the same whether the suggestion to McLachlan is
" This view was held in Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council (igos)
154 Calif. 581, 602, 98 Pac. io27, io36, quoted at length in (1921) 30 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 621. There the union officers "notified" various contractors and
employers of labor that the plaintiff company was "unfair" and that union
men would not work on materials bought from the plaintiff. This caused
various contractors to cancel orders previously given to the plaintiff and accepted
by it. The court said: "The fact that some of them violated their existing
contracts cannot be deemed a wrong caused by the defendants. It was a wrong
for which the contractors alone were responsible." In Cohen etc. Co. v. Brick-
layers' Union (1917) 92 Conn. 161, 167, 1o Atl. 659, 661, Wheeler, J., said: "The
cessation of work was not intended to cause a breach of existing contracts, and
the cancellation of some of its contracts by the plaintiff is, so far as we know,
attributable to the plaintiff's act, rather than to the defendants' . . . . we can
see no unlawfulness in their notice to contractors and employers of what
would happen if nonunion men were employed on jobs on which they were
engaged. The notice was the course of fair dealing. It did not take away
the free choice from the contractor or owner;. it possessed'him of the facts
which might affect his decision." These two cases differ from the instant case
in various details that may be regarded as of importance. In both cases the
defendants indirectly threatened to strike; but in neither does it definitely
appear that the defendants knew of the existing contracts. It is believed,
however, that neither court, in its then existing state of mind, would have
regarded such knowledge as a legally operative fact.
HeinOnline -- 32 Yale L.J. 177 1922-1923
01}I ENTS 177
I arri i t a l si c tr r t t t j it t c
the present riter ill very likely t e f ll e t j rit f
lay or professional readers.
s one test of the defendant's t t t l i tiff, l t t t
s e t t r f t. It ill l t a l
and its president o e no greater "duty" t t e lai tiff t t r
en engaged in other lines f eff rt t li i . t t
, the o ner f a i at-fi is i s , t t
purchaser of hats in the rough fro c ac la , s r li
on hi for a supply but ho has no contract ith hi , s l tell
cLachlan that in his opinion c ac la s l i ti f rt
supply his old custo ers first, t t if t t
expect their continued good ill and trade. If c ac la t r
tells hi that he has already contracted to supply t e lai tiff first, st
acquiesce and infor c achlan t at is f il r t s l ill
no evil consequences? Is not instead privileged to leave the atter
with cLachlan for decision and does not c achlan bear t e s le le al
responsibility for his decision? esti a l , it i l '
legal duty to the plaintiff to supply hi in accordance ith his contract,
and for breach thereof the plaintiff as a le l l r i t
cLachlan. If c achlan, because he fears a l ss f f t re tr it
(trade that is under t ate er t i i ), t
break his contract ith the plaintiff, is not the choice c ac la 's l ,
and is not his act alone the proxi ate and the legal cause of the plaintiff's
loss? It is believed that the court should hold in the affir ative,15,and that
the decision should be the sa e hether the suggestion t c ac la is
,. This view was held in Parkillsol~ Co. v. B1dlding Trades Cou1lcil (1908)
154 Calif, 581, 602, 98 Pac. 1027, 1036, quoted at length in (1921)
LA JOURNAL, 621. There the union officers "notified" various c tract rs a
employers of labor that the plaintiff co pany as "unfair" and that union
en ould not ork on aterials bought fro t e l i tiff. is
various contractors to cancel orders previously given to the plaintiff and accepted
by it. he court said: " he fact t at s f t i01at t i i ti g
contracts cannot be deemed a wrong caused by the defendants. It as a rong
for which the contractors alone ere responsible." I e etc. . . ri -
lasers' Union (1917) 92 Conn. 161, 167, 101 t!. 659, 661, heeler, J., said: " he
cessation of ork as not intended to-cause a reac f isti tr ts,
the cancellation of ~ome of its contracts by the plaintiff is, so far as e ,
attributable to the plaintiff's act, rather than to the defendants' . . . . e can
see no unlawfulness in their notice to contractors and e ployers f at
would happen if nonunion en were e ployed on jobs on hich they ere
engaged. The notice as the course of fair dealing. It i t t e ay
the free choice fro the contractor or o ner;. it ssesse ' i f t f ts
which ight affect his decision." hese t o cases differ fro t e i sta t s
in various details that ay be regarded as of i portance. I t s s t
defendants indirectly threatened to strike; but in neither does it definitely
appear that the defendants kne of the e:'{isting contracts. It is believed,
however, that neither court, in its then existing state of ind, ould have
regarded such knowledge as a legally operative fact.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
made by X in person or by an agent who represents X and his associated
manufacturers.
It may be admitted that judgment should go against the defendant
in case he approached McLachlan with the purpose and intent of causing
the latter to break his contract with the plaintiff. In the instant case
no such purpose or intent was proved. Mere knowledge, however,
on the part of the defendant, that compliance with his request would
probably cause McLachlan to break his contract, is not enough to make
the defendant guilty of a tort. The defendant's duty to the plaintiff
is surely no greater than his duty to society, and it is well established
that one is privileged to sell goods to another even though he knows
that the buyer intends to make an illegal use of the goods.16 Thus
it has been held that it is not illegal to sell liquors to A merely because
the seller "knows" that A intends to use them in breach of the criminal
law; the sale to A not being in itself forbidden, it becomes unlawful
only when made by the seller "with a view" to its subsequent illegal
use by A.17
It seems, therefore, that the defendant was guilty of no breach of
the plaintiff's "property right in the contract." He had "just cause"
for his statement to McLachlan, such cause consisting in his desire
for economic advantages. Such cause may cease to be just and sufficient
if accompanied by a conscious purpose and intent to induce a breach
of contract. The defendant may have had such a purpose and may
have covertly threatened a strike s in order to attain this end; but
judgment should not go against him when there has been no finding
by the court that either fact existed.
A. L. C.
In People v. Gitlow (1922) 234 N. Y. 132, 136 N. E. 317, the New
York Court of Appeals had occasion to interpret and apply the state
statute making "advocacy of criminal anarchy" a felony. The statute
defines "criminal anarchy" as "the doctrine that organized government
should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination .... ,
or by any unlawful means." The defendant, a "left wing socialist,"
plainly advocated in print the overthrow of the existing government
in this country by the mass strike and the establishment in its place by
revolution of a dictatorship of the proletariat. The court wasted no time
on the question of the constitutionality of the statute; and the majority
16 This may not be true in case the illegal use is a crime of great magnitude,
such as murder; but it is true of misdemeanors, and it should be true in
cases of mere torts and breaches of contract.
'Graves v. Johnson (1892) 156 Mass. 211, 30 N. E. 8W8, (19Ol) 179 Mass.
53, 6o N. E. 383.
' That a "threat" to strike may be unlawful even though the strike itself
would not be, see Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation (19o7) 2o HARV.
L. REV. 253, 273.
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